System, Method, and Apparatus for Detecting and Preventing Wireless Connections

ABSTRACT

A method of detecting and disabling offending devices includes monitoring for a radio frequency signal. When an offending device initializes and registers with a cell tower, it emits the radio frequency signal. After the radio frequency signal is detected, a message including an identification of the radio frequency signal is transmitted to a receiver of a base station. Responsive to receiving the message, the base station sends a secure transaction that includes an indication of the radio frequency signal to a processor of a cellular carrier system. Responsive to receiving the secure transaction, the processor of the cellular carrier system correlates a time and the radio frequency signal with an account associated with the registration of the offending device, disconnects from the offending device, and disables an account associated with the offending device.

FIELD

This invention relates to the field of wireless and more particularly toa system for detecting a wireless device then requesting that the devicebe disconnected and disabled from a cellular tower.

BACKGROUND

There are many situations when it is either not desired or not legal toutilize certain types of wireless communications. One good example is inthe corrections environment, where the correctional institution forbidswireless communication by inmates because such communications aredifficult or impossible to monitor and/or control. Law enforcemententities monitor telephone conversations conducted by inmates withincorrectional facilities for various reasons. The telecommunicationsequipment available for use by inmates/detainees within the correctionsenvironment meet various requirements of governments and police byallowing monitoring and/or recording of telephone conversations asneeded.

Cellular technology has progressed in form and size to a point thatinmates in the corrections environment find ways to hide and smugglecellular phones into corrections facilities. For example, some inmateshave had cellular phones delivered by drones. These phones are then usedby inmates to circumvent the required monitoring and/or recording andare often used to communicate amongst themselves to coordinateunauthorized or dangerous activities within the corrections facility.

In correctional facilities, inmates have a limit of a small number ofindividuals that the inmate is permitted to call by way of an approvalprocess in which the inmate petitions for the ability to call, forexample, a family member. The list of allowable contacts often includesfamily members, lawyers, and certain friends. All such calls take placein a very controlled environment, facilitating monitoring and recording,as necessary and legal. Normally, inmates are not permitted to makecalls to certain individuals such as judges, jury members, witnesses,known accomplices, etc., to prevent harassing or other unwanted calls.Some correctional facilities also restrict the time of day and length ofcalls. Such monitoring is typically computer controlled at thecorrectional facility and/or at remote locations, at times, includinghuman monitoring and/or control. Additionally, certain laws and privacynorms prohibit recording of certain conversations such as conversationsbetween an inmate and his/her attorney.

The penetration of communications capable devices such as cellularphones into many correctional facilities has become alarming. Imaginethe harm that results in a purported killer having a smuggled cellularphone and calling judges and jury members every night with threatsagainst them and their families; or being able to continue with unlawfulactivity such as drug dealing through the use of a cellular phone. Yet,cellular phones still find their way into such institutions and are wellhidden. To avoid detection and to extend battery life, often thecellular phones are powered completely off when not in use, thereby notemitting any type of radio frequency signal until the inmate desires tomake a call or data connection. Such devices are so small that they areeasily hidden and, because there is no radio frequency emissions whenpowered off, such devices cannot be detected by radio frequency sweepsof the inmate areas (e.g. cells, common areas, etc.).

In the past, attempts at detecting cellular activity within correctionalfacilities typically consisted of fixed antenna systems, in which,antennas are strategically located throughout the correctional facility.In this, radio frequency bands used by cellular phones are monitored anddetection of any transmission is reported to a central location. Suchsystems require an expensive, fixed infrastructure within thecorrectional facility and only determine that a cellular phone is inuse, without being capable of pinpointing the actual user.

Other systems utilize one or more fixed antenna within the facility thatterminate the unwanted cellular calls, acting as the cellular phonenetwork, thereby making it difficult or impossible to initiate a callfrom a cellular phone within the facility. As with the prior attempts,this too does not pinpoint the actual inmate making the call.Furthermore, because signals from this system may extend beyond theprison walls, this system is capable of inadvertently blocking a validcall which could be disastrous if such a call was an emergency call.Tests have found that such blocking inadvertently captures cell phonesignals from neighboring areas and cell phones in automobiles drivingnearby, blocking innocent communications. There are also questions as towhether such a system would be approved for operation by governmentagencies such as the FCC in the United States. Similarly, jammingdevices are available to prevent connections between these cellularphones and the cellular network/towers, but it is also difficult toassure that such jamming devices will not interfere with legitimatecalls, especially emergency calls and, again, there are questionsrelated to approval by government agencies.

In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission controlsusage of radio frequencies. In general, there are radio frequencies (orbands) that are licensed, military, police, unlicensed, etc. Each bandhas regulations as to who can emit radio frequencies in that band aswell as how much power emission is allowed, etc. In general, thecellular bands are licensed to the cell carriers and only transmissionsby devices provided or approved by the cell carriers are allowed totransmit radio frequencies in those licensed bands. This makes itdifficult to get approval to perform any sort of jamming on theselicensed bands, even within a correctional institution. Note thatwithout changes in legislation, it is currently illegal in the UnitedStates to transmit a signal (especially a jamming signal) on licensedcellular bands.

Another prior attempt to find cellular phones includes portabledetection devices that monitor and detect radio frequency emissions inthe cellular range. Such devices have been found to be less reliablebecause, in a prison environment, often there is a tight inmatecommunication system (e.g. signaling by making certain noises, etc.)that alerts the inmate who is using the cellular phone that a guard iscoming in sufficient time as to power down and/or hide the phone beforethe guard can pinpoint the radio frequency signal. The use of phone(electronics) sniffing dogs faces similar issues when used as theprimary means of cell phone detection.

What is needed is a system that will detect and pinpoint radio frequencyusage for locating and confiscating of unauthorized communicationsequipment; report any detected devices; and prevent connections and/ordisable such devices from making a future connection.

SUMMARY

The basic system provides for radio frequency detection of a devicewithin a specific range of a body worn device. Upon detection of atargeted radio frequency signal, the body worn device communicates to aninfrastructure (base station) to alert of the presence of the targetedradio frequency signal. In such, the user and/or location of the bodyworn device is/are revealed and the source of the radio frequency signalis readily determined for confiscation of the offending device. The basestation then communicates immediately with computers of the cellularproviders and instruct them to disconnect and/or disables the offendingdevice. In some embodiments, other features include locating/tracking ofthe body worn device (and wearer) detection of tampering with or removalof the body worn device, detection of cloaking of the body worn device(e.g. submerging in water or covering with aluminum foil, etc.), andvarious internal diagnostics.

Although there are many applications of the described body worndevice(s), one exemplary use is within correctional facilities. As notedabove, various communications devices are often smuggled intocorrectional facilities and are easily hidden. The use of such devicesis not allowed, but still happens. By equipping at least a subset of theinmate population with the disclosed body worn devices, the correctionalfacility staff is provided the ability to disable and locate any coveredradio frequency emitting device within the correctional facility. Guardsand staff are alerted when the inmate wearing the body worn device orsomeone close to that inmate uses an offending wireless device, such asa cellular phone. Once alerted, the guards know the exact identificationof the inmate and, therefore, the location of the illegal deviceenabling confiscation of the illegal device.

In one embodiment, a system for detecting and disabling radio frequencyemitting devices is disclosed including at least one base station thathas a processor and a base station transceiver that is operativelycoupled to the base station processor. There are one or more body worndevices, each having a processor, a transceiver operatively coupled tothe processor, a radio frequency detector operatively coupled to theprocessor, and a source of power. When an offending device is present,software running on the processor of the body worn device communicateswith the radio frequency detector and, if a target radio frequencyand/or protocol from the offending device is detected by the radiofrequency detector (indicating an attempt by the offending device toregister with a cell tower), the software initiates a communication fromthe transceiver to the base station transceiver indicating that thetarget radio signal was detected. Upon receipt of the communicationindicating that the target radio signal was detected at the base stationtransceiver, software running on the base station processor sends asecure transaction to a processor of the cellular carrier system; thesecure transaction including an indication of the target radio signalthat was detected. Upon receipt of the communication indicating that thetarget radio signal was detected, software running on the processor ofthe cellular carrier system correlates a time and the target radiofrequency with an account associated with a recent registration of theoffending device and if the cellular carrier system correlates the timeand target radio signal to the account associated with the recentregistration, the software running on the processor of the cellularcarrier system disconnects with the offending device and disables theaccount associated with the offending device.

In another embodiment, a method of detecting and disabling offendingdevices is disclosed. The method includes (a) monitoring a predeterminedradio frequency at a body worn device. When the (b) offending deviceinitializes and registers with a cell tower, it emits a predeterminedradio frequency and/or energy pattern. (c) After the predetermined radiosignal is detected at the body worn device, a message is transmittedfrom a transmitter of the body worn device to a receiver of a basestation. The message includes an identification of the body worn deviceand the predetermined radio frequency that was detected. (d) Responsiveto receiving the message, the base station sends a secure transaction toa processor of the cellular carrier system, the secure transactionincludes an indication of the predetermined radio frequency and/ortiming information. (e) Responsive to receiving the secure transaction,the processor of the cellular carrier system correlates a time and thepredetermined radio signal with an account associated with theregistration of the offending device and if the processor of thecellular carrier system correlates the time and predetermined radiofrequency to the account associated with the registration, in someembodiments, the software running on the processor of the cellularcarrier system disconnects from the offending device and disables theaccount associated with the offending device. In some embodiments, thesoftware running on the processor of the cellular carrier system legallyrecords some or all of the data and/or communications beforedisconnecting from the offending device and disabling the accountassociated with the offending device.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The invention can be best understood by those having ordinary skill inthe art by reference to the following detailed description whenconsidered in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in which:

FIG. 1 illustrates a schematic view of a typical wireless communicationsystem and body worn device.

FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram of a body worn device.

FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram of a second body worn device.

FIG. 4 illustrates a perspective view of an exemplary body worn device.

FIG. 5 illustrates a block diagram of communications used to initializea body worn device.

FIG. 6 illustrates a block diagram of a body worn device detectingwireless activity.

FIG. 7 illustrates a block diagram of a body worn device detectingwireless activity and location derivation of the body worn device.

FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary user interface showing the status of abody worn device.

FIG. 9 illustrates an exemplary user interface showing the status of abody worn device when the body worn device has been cloaked.

FIG. 10 illustrates an exemplary user interface showing the status of abody worn device upon detection of unauthorized communications.

FIG. 10A illustrates an exemplary account record of an account of acellular phone.

FIG. 11 illustrates a flow chart of an exemplary body worn devicecontroller.

FIG. 12 illustrates a second flow chart of a second exemplary body worndevice controller.

FIG. 13 illustrates a third flow chart of a typical transmission by abody worn device controller.

FIG. 14 illustrates a flow chart of an exemplary base stationcontroller.

FIG. 15 illustrates a schematic view of a typical computer-based bodyworn device system.

FIG. 16 illustrates a schematic view of an exemplary system of a basestation.

FIG. 17 illustrates a partial flow chart of an exemplary processor of acellular carrier system.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Reference will now be made in detail to the presently preferredembodiments of the invention, examples of which are illustrated in theaccompanying drawings. Throughout the following detailed description,the same reference numerals refer to the same elements in all figures.

The described system pertains to a collection of hardware devices formonitoring the location and environment of any target person. Throughoutthis description, the target person is typically a detained person suchas an inmate in a correctional facility, but there is no restriction toany particular type of target person, nor that the target be a humanbeing, in that the described body worn device functions the same for anytype of movable object. The described system is equally applicable toany other type of scenario. For example, the target person is a teenchild and the body worn device is worn by the teen child to monitor, forexample, cell phone usage while driving.

For simplicity purposes, the following description uses, as an example,the inmate as the target person. In general, depending upon security andpolicies at a prison, the population (inmates) is not allowed tocommunicate with those inside or outside the prison without usingapproved forms of communication that are easily monitored by prisonauthorities. In such, the inmate population is not allowed to usepagers, cellular phones, cordless phones, wireless Internet access,walkie-talkies, etc., to communicate with anybody, within or outside ofthe prison. Attempts to keep devices capable of such communications outof the hands of inmates has proved ineffective, in that inmates havelong periods of time to think of ways to smuggle communications devicesinto the prison and, to hide those devices once the devices are withinthe prison. This is further exacerbated by potential corruption withinthe prison staff and guards.

Jamming devices are well known in the industry. Typically, jammingdevices emit random radio frequency noise, random pulse, stepped tones,warbler tones, pulses, or sweep through a range of radio frequencies.Such radio frequency emissions in the proper bands are capable ofjamming other radio frequency devices, such as cellular phones, CitizenBand (CB) devices, etc.

Some jamming devices recognize digital modulation techniques and, uponrecognizing the presence of a cellphone utilizing the digital modulationtechnique, such jamming devices continuously attempts to connect withthe cellphone, aborting the connection before it is complete, thenstarting over again.

As discussed above, the FCC does not readily permit unauthorizedemission of radio frequency energy in certain licensed bands such asthose used by cellphones, even in a prison environment. If such ispermitted, then a jamming signal can be used, but if not permitted, nojamming is allowed.

If jamming is allowed, the body worn device described will be able toemit jamming signals, but having limited power (e.g. from a rechargeablebattery), reduction of power consumption is critical. Therefore,continuous emission of a series of jamming signals is less desirable assuch will consume too much of the precious battery power.

Throughout this description, a body worn device is used as an embodimentthat is easy to understand and is understood in the field of lawenforcement and corrections. There is no limitation placed upon the typeof device that the disclosed system for detecting and disabling radiofrequency emitting devices be embodied, as it is fully anticipated thatthe disclosed system for detecting and disabling radio frequencyemitting devices be embodied in stationary housings, both hidden orvisible, such as wall-mounted devices, devices placed in drop ceilings,ceiling-mounted devices, devices mounted beneath tables, etc.

Throughout this description, the term cellular carrier system orcellular carrier refers to a collection of hardware and software thatprovides cellular phone service to a plurality of cellular phones andincludes cell towers, computers, and software that operates the celltowers, maintains accounts for authorized cellular phones, connectscellular phones to each other and non-cellular phones, etc.

Referring to FIG. 1, a schematic view of a typical wirelesscommunication system 5 is shown, in which a body worn device 40 ispresent. The overall structure, communication paths, and connectionrelationships shown are one example of a wireless communication system 5and are not meant to limit this disclosure in any way. Many differentorganizations, protocols, operating frequencies (bands), andarchitectures are anticipated and all of which are included here within.The body worn device 40 is intended to operate with any known network,including the cellular network 10, for example, all known and futurewireless networks or point-to-point systems. Wireless networks, are forexample, the cellular phone network (e.g., GSM, 4G, 5G, CDMA, AMPS),wireless Internet (e.g. WiFi-802.11x), etc. Point-to-point systemsinclude Bluetooth, citizen band radios, walkie-talkie radios, and anyother licensed or unlicensed forms of wireless communications. Thesecommunication systems enable any number of devices 12/14/15 (e.g.cellular phones 12, personal computers 14, tablet computers 15) tocommunicate wirelessly with each other or through a network such as thecellular network 10 as shown. In the system shown in FIG. 1, devices12/14/15 communicate with each other or to other devices (not shown; forexample land-line phones), either through the cellular network 10 ordirectly between each other using, for example, a point-to-pointprotocol such as Bluetooth. As known in the industry, the cellularnetwork 10 often consists of one or more devices such as cellulartowers, repeaters, wireless network adapters, etc., which are not shownin FIG. 1 for brevity reasons.

Throughout this description, a cellular network 10 is used as anexample, though this example is not to be interpreted as limiting in anyway. In the example of the cellular network 10, each device 12/14/15communicates with cellular towers utilizing a pre-defined protocol and apre-defined frequency or set of frequencies. As known in the industry,cellular networks 10 are assigned a set of frequencies in which they areallowed to operate (in the US the assignment is made by the FederalCommunications Commission or FCC), and, depending upon the protocol, thefrequencies are allocated for certain parts of the protocol such assignaling (e.g. indicating the desire to make a connection), voicecommunications, data communications, etc. It is also known, based uponthe protocol, how to process/avoid collisions (e.g. two cellular phones12 attempt to initiate a call at the same time), how to handle varyingdistances from the cellular towers (e.g. measuring signal strength andsignaling a request for increases or decreases in power output), and howto hand off a cellular phone call from one cellular tower to the next,etc.

Throughout this description, a single device 12/14/15 is used forclarity and brevity reasons, that being called the offending device 12which, is by example, a cell phone, though the present invention is inno way limited to detecting and thwarting cell phones, as any devicecapable of communicating wirelessly is anticipated including, but notlimited to any type of cell phone 12, personal computers 14, tabletcomputers 15, smart watches, smart televisions, etc.

Whatever the wireless communication technology is being used, everydevice 12/14/15 must, at some time, emit a radio frequency signal 20/21that is then received by one or more receivers within the cellularnetwork 10 (e.g. cell towers). Although it is desired to communicatesuch radio frequency signals 20/21 directionally to a remote entity(e.g. cell tower) within the cellular network 10 (or other device in apoint-to-point system), the laws of physics do not cooperate and theradio frequency signal 20 radiates in multiple directions from anantenna, the antenna being associated with (internal, external, orconnected) the transmitting device (e.g. devices 12/14/15. For example,when an offending device 12 (e.g. cell phone) initializes, the offendingdevice 12 communicates with the cellular network 10 to register with thecellular carrier system 11, some portion of the radio frequency signal21 reaches an antenna 82/82A (see FIG. 2) within the body worn device40. Likewise, when the cellular network 10 communicates to the offendingdevice 12, some portion of the radio frequency signal 23 also reachesthe antenna 82/82A within the body worn device 40. In this way, the bodyworn device 40 receives some portion of the radio frequency energyemitted from any devices 12/14/15 or cellular network 10 that is withinrange (e.g. the signal strength of the radio frequency is sufficient forthe body worn device to detect that signal).

Within the body worn device 40 is circuitry 50/50A (see FIGS. 2 and 3)that implements the various features of the body worn device 40,including some or all of radio frequency detection, communications witha base station 110, tamper detection, positioning, and powering of theabove.

Referring to FIG. 2, a block diagram of the circuitry 50 of the bodyworn device 40 is shown. The various communications paths62/63/64/65/66/67 are examples and any number, type, and directionalityof communications paths that are anticipated to accomplish thefunctionality described here within. In some embodiments, a busarchitecture is used to implement the communications paths62/63/64/65/66/67, while in other embodiments, direct connections,serial links, input output pins/ports, etc., are used to signal betweenthe various subsystems 60/70/80/90 as known in the industry.

The circuitry 50 of the body worn device 40 includes a source of power98. It is well known how to power such devices ranging from miniaturebody worn devices such as watches to more complicated devices that areoften specialized worn devices such as house-arrest tracking devices.Any source(s) of power are anticipated, including, but not limited to,batteries, rechargeable batteries, solar cells, radio frequencyparasitic extraction, capacitors, super capacitors, fuel cells, etc.,including combinations of such. The source of power 98 includescircuitry to condition and regulate the power which is then distributedto the various subsystems 60/70/80/90 by power distribution 99 which areany known conductors as used in the industry, including, but not limitedto, wires, printed circuit paths, etc. In some embodiments, the sourceof power 98 further includes circuitry to control charging as well as aconnection or interface to a source of charging power (e.g. a wall-wart,base station, etc.).

In this example, two radio frequency receiver/detection circuits 80/80Aare shown interfaced to the processor 60, though any number of radiofrequency receiver/detection circuits 80/80A is anticipated, includingone. The processor controls the operation of the radio frequencyreceiver/detection circuits 80/80A by sending commands 65 to the radiofrequency receiver/detection circuits 80/80A and receiving status anddata back 66 in a similar manner (e.g. signal frequency, signalstrength, signal content). The radio frequency receiver/detectioncircuits 80/80A include one or more antenna 82/82A as needed, eitherinternal or external to an enclosure 41 of the body worn device 40 (seeFIG. 4). Again, although, for completeness, two radio frequencyreceiver/detection circuits 80/80A are shown, each detecting a specificfrequency range or band of radio frequency energy, any number of radiofrequency receiver/detection circuits 80/80A are anticipated (includinga single radio frequency receiver/detection circuit 80), each having asmany antenna 82/82A as needed to properly detect the targeted radiofrequency or radio frequency spectrum. For example, in some embodiments,there is a single radio frequency receiver/detection circuit 80 having asingle antenna 82. In another exemplary embodiment, there is a singleradio frequency receiver/detection circuit 80 having two antennas 82/82Awhich are switched or mixed as known in the industry. In anotherexemplary embodiment, there are two radio frequency receiver/detectioncircuits 80/80A, each having one antenna 82/82A. Again, any number ofradio frequency receiver/detection circuits 80/80A with any number ofantenna 82/82A are anticipated with any type of antenna 82/82A.

In some embodiments, the radio frequency receiver/detection circuits80/80A operate independently of the processor 60, notifying theprocessor 60 of the detection of any of the targeted radio frequencies(e.g. cellular band frequencies, etc.). In some embodiments, theprocessor 60 performs some of the radio frequency detection, such assetting or sweeping the detection frequency and comparing the receivedradio frequency power levels at each frequency to a predeterminedacceptable value. For example, the processor 60 instructs the firstradio frequency receiver/detection circuit 80 to monitor three specificfrequencies, such as 900 MHz, 1.8 GHz and 1.9 Ghz, and then reads back asignal strength from the radio frequency receiver/detection circuit 80,comparing the signal strength to an internal threshold, signaling analert if the threshold is exceeded. There are many divisions of thedetection functionality anticipated and the disclosed system is notlimited in any way to any particular implementation of the disclosedfunctionality. In some embodiments, there is a threshold for eachfrequency or range of frequencies; while in other embodiments there is asingle threshold that applies to all frequencies. In some embodiments,the radio frequency receiver/detection circuits 80/80A analyze the radiofrequency signatures to determine the type of signal in addition to thesignal strength (e.g. is it a random radio frequency signal or is itencoded with cellular packets?).

The tamper detection subsystem 90 is also interfaced to the processor60. The processor 60 controls the operation of the tamper detectionsubsystem 90 by sending commands and/or signals to the tamper detectionsubsystem 90 and receiving status and data back in a similar manner 67(e.g. “intact” or “device removed from body,” etc.). It is anticipatedthat the body worn device 40 is issued to a particular individual (e.g.inmate) and is locked onto that person by, for example, a leg cuff, armcuff, neck cuff, belt, etc. Although the body worn device 40 is securedto the person and not easily removed, it is important that any tamperingwith the body worn device 40 be detected (and reported). There are manymethods of detecting tampering or removal of a body worn device 40 knownin the industry, all of which are anticipated and included here within.For example, in some embodiments, a conduction path fully encircles thebody appendage to which the body worn device 40 is attached such that,if the enclosure 41 (see FIG. 4) is cut, the circuit opens and the opencircuit is detected by the tamper detection subsystem 90. This is asomewhat simple method that is used as an example; in that, a cleverperson can expose the conductor in two locations, attach an end of awire to the conductor in each location, then cut through the strap inbetween the two locations without detection. In some embodiments, moreelaborate measurements are used to detect the added resistance (orchange in resistance) of the external wire. In some embodiments, anoptical light pipe connected at both ends to the body worn device 40encircles the appendage and a particular wavelength(s) of light or anencoded light wave signal is emitted into one end of the light pipe. Ifthe signal is detected at the other end, then it is believed that notampering has occurred, but if the signal is not detected, thentampering is detected and an appropriate alert is transmitted as will bedescribed. There are many types of tamper detection devices anticipatedincluding the above and/or any other type of tamper detection including,but not limited to, motion sensors and accelerometers (e.g. if nomovement is detected for a long period of time it is assumed that thebody worn device 40 has been removed from the body).

In some embodiments, the tamper detection subsystem 90 also includesintrusion detection to determine if the enclosure 41 (see FIG. 4) aroundthe electronics has been penetrated. Again, there are many ways todetect such intrusion as known in the industry, all of which areincluded here within. For example, a simple method includes a microswitch that detects opening of a cover of the enclosure, or thedetection of light within the enclosure 41 (see FIG. 4). Normally, thereis no light being that the enclosure 41 is made of a non-lighttransmitting material and completely sealed with no openings, but whenthe enclosure 41 is compromised, light is allowed to enter the enclosure41 and triggers the tamper detection subsystem 90. In other embodiments,there is an internal detector that detects one or more materials orphysical state normally present in the atmosphere (e.g. change inpressure, humidity, oxygen, nitrogen, etc.) and the enclosure 41 iseither evacuated or filled with some other gas (e.g. helium). In this,normally, the detector measures presence or absence of the material, butwhen the enclosure 41 is cut, atmosphere enters the housing, the gain orloss of the material is detected, and the tamper detection subsystem 90is triggered.

In some embodiments, the circuitry 50 of the body worn device 40communicates with the land based system (e.g. base stations 110) througha wireless transceiver 70, preferably having an antenna 74, though insome embodiments, the wireless transceiver 70 utilizes the antenna 82used in radio frequency detection, for example, using a splitter orantenna switch (not shown). The wireless transceiver 70 is interfaced tothe processor 60 and the processor 60 communicates with and controls theoperation of the wireless transceiver 70 by sending commands 62 and data63 to the wireless transceiver 70 and receiving status and data back ina similar manner. Because such transceivers often consume significantpower, in some embodiments, the processor 60 has an enable interface 64to power down the wireless transceiver 70 (or any other subsystem) whennot in use. Any appropriate signaling protocol is anticipated, astransmission collisions with other body worn devices 40, lost packets,out-of-order packets, noise, etc., must be overcome. The data andsignaling is modulated onto a radio frequency using any modulationformat such as frequency modulation, amplitude modulation, pulse codemodulation, pulse width modulation, etc.

It is anticipated that the wireless transceiver 70 be any type oftransceiver, operating over any known frequency or group of frequencies,any known power level(s), and either half-duplex or full-duplex. Whenthe wireless transceiver 70 is half-duplex, the processor 60 controlswhether the wireless transceiver 70 is receiving or it is transmittingby a mode control 62.

Data is transferred between the processor 60 and the wirelesstransceiver 70 in any way known in the industry including, but notlimited to, shared memory (not shown), serial transfer, paralleltransfer, any combination, etc. In some embodiments, though notrequired, data from the processor 60 is encrypted before transmission.In such, the data is either encrypted by instructions running on theprocessor 60, or, in some embodiments, by an encryption module 72 withinor external to the wireless transceiver 70. Also, in a preferredembodiment, though not required, data from the base station 110 (seeFIG. 6) is encrypted before transmission. In such, the encrypted data isreceived by the wireless transceiver 70, and then the encrypted data iseither decrypted by instructions running on the processor 60, or, insome embodiments, by the hardware encryption module 72 within orexternal to the wireless transceiver 70.

Any band, frequency, wavelength, set of wavelengths, protocols, protocolstacks are anticipated for use by the wireless transceiver 70 (and basestation transceiver 935 in FIG. 16). There are many protocols andprotocol options that provide various transmission capabilities toimprove reliability of communications, reduction or elimination oftransmission errors, and/or efficiencies in both spectrum usage as wellas power consumption. For example, especially in systems that includeheartbeat transmissions, it is known to provide each body worn device 40with a predetermined back-off period or, instead, a random back-offperiod is created by the processor 60 such that timing of transmissionsare controlled to reduce collisions between multiple body worn devices40. In such, for example, if there are 600 body worn devices 40 and eachemits a heartbeat every hour, it is preferred that the heartbeattransmissions are distributed either sequentially or randomly over thathour, such that, for example, during any given minute, 10 of these bodyworn devices 40 transmit heartbeats and, preferably, these 10transmissions are distributed either sequentially or randomly over thatminute, to further reduce collisions.

In some embodiments, a piezoelectric or other sound emitting device 97is included. In some such embodiments, the sound emitting device 97emits a sound as an audible alert when an event such as tampering or atargeted RF signal is detected. The audible alert from the soundemitting device is used to augment the wireless delivery of the alertinformation or as an alternative. For example, if a wirelesscommunication fails, the audible alert is initiated.

In some embodiments, a clock or timekeeper 59 is included, either as asubsystem of the processor 60 or a separate, discrete timing device thatis interface to the processor 60. In such embodiments, the body worndevice 40 has the ability to record the time and/or date of any eventand to transmit the time and/or date to the base station 110 along withany alert and/or heartbeat transmission.

After the processor 60 detects an offending radio frequency signal (e.g.after the processor 60 receives indication of a specific signal strengthof a specific wavelength and optionally a specific protocol packet fromone of the radio frequency receiver/detection circuits 80/80A), theprocessor initiates a transaction from the wireless transceiver 70 tothe base station 110.

Although jamming of the transmission is possible and desirable, laws incertain countries do not allow emission of radio frequency signals oncertain bands without proper licenses. As the offending device 12 islikely initiating communications with a cellular carrier system 11 (seeFIG. 6), a different approach is taken other than jamming.

For covert operations (e.g. as done in prisons), the offending devices12 are often turned completely off when not attempting a call so as notto be detectable by radio frequency sniffers, etc. Therefore, once theoffending device 12 is turned on, the offending device 12 attempts toregister with a cell tower by emitting a relatively high power radiofrequency signal at a specific frequency (with the requisite protocol).After the processor 60 detects this specific radio frequency signal (andpossibly a specific protocol), the processor 60 initiates a transactionfrom the wireless transceiver 70 to the base station 110, including thespecific frequency of the radio frequency signal. The base station 110immediately sends a secure transaction to the cellular carrier system11, including the specific frequency. As the cellular carrier system 11has knowledge of which devices are initializing at what time, thecellular carrier system 11 correlates the specific frequency of theattempt to register the offending device 12 with the cellular carriersystem 11. Now the cellular carrier system 11 takes an agreed uponaction to thwart the offending device's 12 attempt to register and senddata or make a phone call by, for example, disconnecting from theoffending device 12, disabling certain features for the offending device12 (e.g., disabling data transmission, disabling calls, disabling callsexcept for emergency calls). The net results is the offending device 12is unable to send/receive data and unable to make illegal phone calls.Further, as each offending device 12 is provisioned by a cellularcompany (e.g. has an account), it is anticipated that further steps betaken to lock the account, and in some embodiments, details of theaccount holder are provided to law enforcement personnel (e.g. under asubpoena) to determine what party is registering the offending devices12.

Referring to FIG. 3, a block diagram of a second exemplary circuit 50Aof the body worn device 40 is shown that includes Global Positioning.The various communications paths 62/63/64/65/66/67/68/69 are examplesand any number, type, and directionality of communications paths areanticipated to accomplish the functionality described here within. Insome embodiments, a bus architecture is used to implement thecommunications paths 62/63/64/65/66/67/68/69, while in otherembodiments, direct connections, serial links, input output pins/ports,etc., are used to signal between the various subsystems 60/70/80/90/94.

The second exemplary circuit 50A of the body worn device 40 includes asource of power 98. It is well known how to power such devices rangingfrom simple body worn devices such as watches to more complicateddevices that are often body worn such as cellular phones, to specializedworn devices such as house-arrest tracking devices. Any source(s) ofpower are anticipated, including, but not limited to, batteries,rechargeable batteries, solar cells, radio frequency parasiticextraction, capacitors, super capacitors, fuel cells, etc., includingcombinations of such. The source of power 98 includes circuitry tocondition and regulate the power which is then distributed to thevarious subsystems 60/70/80/90/94 by power distribution 99 (e.g.conductors) which are any known conductor as used in the industry,including, but not limited to, wires, printed circuit paths, etc. Insome embodiments, the source of power 98 further includes circuitry tocontrol charging as well as a connection or interface to a source ofcharging power.

The radio frequency receiver/detection circuits 80/80A are interfaced tothe processor 60. The processor controls the operation of the radiofrequency receiver/detection circuit 80/80A by sending commands 65 tothe radio frequency receiver/detection circuits 80/80A and receivingstatus and data back 66 in a similar manner (e.g. signal frequency andstrength). The radio frequency receiver/detection circuits 80/80Ainclude one or more antenna 82/82A as needed, either internal orexternal to an enclosure 41 (see FIG. 4) of the body worn device 40.Although, for completeness, two radio frequency receiver/detectioncircuits 80/80A are shown, each detecting a specific frequency range orband of radio frequency energy, any number of radio frequencyreceiver/detection circuits 80/80A are anticipated, each having as manyantenna 82/82A as needed to properly receive and detect the targetedradio frequency or radio frequency spectrum. For example, in someembodiments, there is a single radio frequency receiver/detectioncircuit 80 having a single antenna 82. In another exemplary embodiment,there is a single radio frequency receiver/detection circuit 80 havingtwo antennas 82/82A which are switched or mixed as known in theindustry. In another exemplary embodiment, there are two radio frequencyreceiver/detection circuits 80/82, each having one antenna 82/82A.Again, any number of radio frequency receiver/detection circuits 80/82with any number of antenna 82/82A are anticipated with any type ofantenna.

The tamper detection subsystem 90 is also interfaced to the processor60. The processor 60 controls the operation of the tamper detectionsubsystem 90 by sending commands and/or signals to the tamper detectionsubsystem 90 and receiving status and data back in a similar manner 67(e.g. intact or “device removed from body,” etc.). It is anticipatedthat the body worn device 40 is issued to a particular individual (e.g.inmate) and is to be locked onto that person by, for example, a legcuff, arm cuff, neck cuff, belt, etc. Although the body worn device 40is secured to the person and not easily removed, it is important thatany tampering with the body worn device 40 be detected. There are manymethods of detecting tampering or removal of a body worn device 40 knownin the industry, all of which are anticipated and included here within.For example, in some embodiments, a conduction path fully encircles thebody appendage to which the body worn device 40 is attached such that,if the strap 42 (see FIG. 4) is cut, the circuit opens and is detectedby the tamper detection subsystem 90. This is a somewhat simple methodthat is used as an example; in that, a clever person can expose theconductor in two locations, attach ends of a wire to the conductor ineach location, then cut through the strap 42 in between the twolocations without detection.

In some embodiments, a method of determining the body worn device'sproximity to the body is used to determine if the device has beenremoved. Some methods known in the industry for detecting proximityinclude continuity sensors and mechanical switches that determine if thedevice is no longer in contact with the body. Such continuity sensorsand mechanical switches are prone to false positives and nuisance alertsand can be defeated more easily than other methods.

In some embodiments, measurements are used to detect the addedresistance (or change in resistance) of the external wire. In someembodiments, an optical light pipe embedded in a strap encircles thebody part to which the body worn device 40 is attached and a specificwavelength an encoded light wave signal is emitted or periodicallyemitted into one end of the light pipe. If the same signal is detectedat the other end, then it is believed that no tampering has been done,but if the signal is not detected, then tampering is detected.

In some embodiments, the tamper detection subsystem 90 also includesintrusion detection to determine if the enclosure 41 around theelectronics has been penetrated. Again, there are many ways to detectsuch intrusion as known in the industry, all of which are included herewithin. For example, a simple method includes the detection of lightwithin the enclosure 41. Normally, there is no light being that theenclosure 41 is completely sealed with no openings, but when theenclosure 41 is penetrated, light is allowed to enter and triggers thetamper detection subsystem 90. In other embodiments, there is aninternal detector that detects one or more materials or physicstypically present in the atmosphere (e.g., atmospheric pressure,humidity, oxygen, nitrogen, etc.) and the enclosure 41 is eitherevacuated or filled with some other gas (e.g. helium). In this,normally, the detector measures little or no presence of the material,but when the enclosure 41 is cut, atmosphere enters the enclosure 41,the material is detected, and the tamper detection subsystem 90 istriggered.

There are many tamper detection mechanisms known in the industry, all ofwhich are anticipated for use with the body worn device 40. Furtherexamples include the use of a motion sensor or accelerometer todetermine if the device experiences long periods of time with no motion,indicating that the device has been removed and has been placedsomewhere in a static mode.

In some embodiments, the body worn device 40 communicates with the landbased system (e.g. base stations 110) through a wireless transmitter orwireless transceiver 70, preferably a transceiver having an antenna 74,though in some embodiments, the wireless transmitter or wirelesstransceiver 70 utilizes the antenna 82 used in radio frequency detectionthrough, for example, a splitter or antenna switch (not shown). Thewireless transmitter or wireless transceiver 70 is interfaced to theprocessor 60 and the processor 60 communicates with and controls theoperation of the wireless interface and wireless transmitter or wirelesstransceiver 70 by sending commands 62 and data 63 to the wirelesstransmitter or wireless transceiver 70 and receiving status and databack in a similar manner. Because such transceivers often consumesignificant power, in some embodiments, the processor 60 has an enableinterface 64 to power down the wireless transmitter or wirelesstransceiver 70 (or any other subsystem such as the positioning subsystem94) when not in use.

Throughout this description, the wireless transmitter or wirelesstransceiver 70 is the preferred form of communications with the basestation 110. The wireless transmitter or wireless transceiver 70transmits a wireless signal to the base station and (for transceivers)receives a wireless signal back, either on the sameband/wavelength/frequency or a different band/wave/frequency utilizingany protocol or stack of protocols. For example, if a signal/messagefrom the wireless transmitter or wireless transceiver 70 of the bodyworn device 40 is not received and acknowledged by the base stationtransceiver 935 (see FIG. 16) within a protocol timeout period or if itis received with errors and negatively acknowledged, the signal/messageis retransmitted. In some embodiments in which the wireless transmitteror wireless transceiver 70 is a transmit-only device, there is noacknowledgement possible and no mechanism to determine if thetransmission succeeded.

It is anticipated that the wireless transceiver 70 be any type oftransceiver, operating over any known frequency or group of frequencies,using any known modulation technique, at any known power level(s), andeither half-duplex or full-duplex. When the wireless transceiver 70 ishalf-duplex, the processor 60 controls whether the transceiver isreceiving or it is transmitting by a mode control 62.

Data is transferred between the processor 60 and the wirelesstransceiver 70 in any way known in the industry including, but notlimited to, shared memory (not shown), serial transfer, paralleltransfer, any combination, etc. In a preferred embodiment, though notrequired, data from the processor 60 is encrypted before transmission.In such, the data is either encrypted by instructions running on theprocessor 60, or, in some embodiments, by an encryption module 72 withinor external to the wireless transceiver 70. Also in a preferredembodiment, though not required, data from the base station 110 (seeFIG. 6) is encrypted before transmission. In such, the encrypted data isreceived by the wireless transceiver 70, and then the encrypted data iseither decrypted by instructions running on the processor 60, or, insome embodiments, by a encryption module 72 within or external to thewireless transceiver 70.

In the embodiment of FIG. 3, positioning capability is included. Forexample, a Global Positioning Satellite Receiver 94 is interfaced to theprocessor 60. In such, the processor controls the Global PositioningSatellite Receiver 94 operation by sending commands 69 to the GlobalPositioning Satellite Receiver 94 and receiving status and data 68 fromthe Global Positioning Satellite Receiver 94 (e.g. latitude andlongitude). Typically, the Global Positioning Satellite Receiver 94 hasa specialized antenna 96 or array of antenna 96. Any known type ofpositioning system is anticipated for use with the body worn device 40.Data from the Global Positioning Satellite Receiver 94 is used by theprocessor to determine if the body worn device 40 is at a location thatis not permitted or has not moved for a certain period of time (forexample, if the body worn device 40 has been removed from an inmate).

Upon detecting an offending radio frequency signal (e.g. after theprocessor 60 receives indication of a specific signal strength of aspecific wavelength from one of the radio frequency receiver/detectioncircuits 80/82), the processor initiates transmission of a packet ofinformation to the base station 110.

After the processor 60 detects an offending radio frequency signal (e.g.after the processor 60 receives indication of a specific signal strengthof a specific wavelength and optionally a specific protocol packet fromone of the radio frequency receiver/detection circuits 80/80A), theprocessor initiates a transaction from the wireless transceiver 70 tothe base station 110.

Although jamming of the transmission is possible and desirable, laws incertain countries do not allow emission of radio frequency signals oncertain bands without proper licenses. As the offending device 12 islikely initiating communications with a cellular carrier system 11 (FIG.6), a different approach is taken other than jamming.

For covert operations (e.g. as done in prisons), the offending devices12 are often turned completely off when not attempting a call so as notto be detectable by radio frequency sniffers, etc. Therefore, once theoffending device 12 is turned on, the offending device 12 attempts toregister with a cell tower by emitting a relatively high-power radiofrequency signal at a specific frequency (with the requisite protocol).After the processor 60 detects this specific radio frequency signal (andpossibly a specific protocol), the processor 60 initiates a transactionfrom the wireless transceiver 70 to the base station 110, including thespecific frequency of the radio frequency signal. The base station 110immediately sends a secure transaction to the cellular carrier system11, including the specific frequency. As the cellular carrier system 11knows which devices are initializing at what time, the cellular carriersystem 11 correlates the specific frequency of the attempt to registerthe offending device 12 with the cell tower. Now the cellular carriersystem 11 takes an agreed upon action to thwart the offending device's12 attempt to register and send data or make a phone call by, forexample, disconnecting from the offending device 12, disabling certainfeatures for the offending device 12 (e.g., disabling data transmission,disabling calls, disabling calls except for emergency calls). The netresults is the offending device 12 is unable to send/receive data andunable to make illegal phone calls. Further, as each offending device 12is provisioned by a cellular company (e.g. has an account), it isanticipated that further steps be taken to lock the account, and in someembodiments, details of the account holder are provided to lawenforcement personnel (e.g. under a subpoena) to determine what party isregistering the offending devices 12.

Referring to FIG. 4, a perspective view of an exemplary body worn device40 is shown. In this example, the body worn device 40 is a collar, suchas a leg collar, arm collar, or neck collar, while in other embodiments;the body worn device 40 is of slightly different forms for attachment tothe body in different ways such as by a belt-like system. In theexemplary body worn device 40 shown in FIG. 4, some or all of thecircuitry 50/50A are located within an enclosure 41 that is made as partof the strap 42 or affixed to the strap 42 so as to resist removaland/or intrusion. The strap 42 is locked closed after placing around theperson's appendage, for example by a tamper-proof lock 44. In someembodiments, the lock 44 is part of the enclosure 41. In someembodiments, the tamper-proof lock includes a one-way closure system inwhich, the strap 42 is tightened around an appendage by capturing moreof the strap 42 through the one-way closure system, then cutting off anyexcess of the strap 42. In some embodiments, especially those withelectronics, conductors, and/or light pipes within the strap 42, thestrap 42 is of fixed length and locks into the enclosure 41, completingthe tamper detection circuit. In the industry of inmate or releasemonitoring (e.g. house arrest), it is well known how to attach a bodyworn device 40 to a person and to detect tampering and/or removal, allof which are anticipated and included here within.

Although any form of attachment mechanism is anticipated for the bodyworn device 40, in some embodiments, the attachment mechanisms andenclosure 41 are designed to prevent removal under normal wear andimpact that often occurs during the wearing of such device such as,during exercise, walking, running, etc. Furthermore, in someembodiments, the attachment mechanisms and enclosure 41 are designed toresist penetration by substances that normally contact the wearer suchas during showering, rain, etc. Although any suitable material isanticipated, it is preferred that at least the surface of the strap 42and/or enclosure 41 be made from a hypoallergenic material such asSantoprene, being that the body worn device 40 will be worn for longperiods of time. It is also preferred that the strap 42 be made frommaterials that will not significantly stretch, even when heated.Stretching is not desired because, in some cases, stretching enableseasy removal without detection of tampering. In some embodiments, theenclosure 41 is made of an impact resistant polycarbonate that isrugged, tamper resistant, and seals the electronics from the surroundingenvironment.

As previously described, in some embodiments, the body worn device 40includes a perimeter detection loop 45 that consists of a conductor(either light or electrical signal) that helps detect tampering. Forexample, if the strap 42 is cut, the perimeter detection loop 45 isbroken and a tamper signal is sent from the wireless transceiver 70 ofthe body worn device 40 to the base station 110.

In some embodiments, an RFID 46 is mounted in/on the enclosure 41 and/orin the strap 42. This optional RFID (or other readable mechanism such asa bar code, QR code, etc.) is available for use to interment facilityfor many uses such as head counts, usage accounting, commissary expensecharges, etc.

Referring to FIG. 5, a block diagram of communications used toinitialize a body worn device 40 is shown. For example, a body worndevice 40 is issued 100 to a user (e.g. an inmate). In some embodiments,user data 103 is captured and/or linked to the body worn device 40 aseach body worn device 40 is identifiable, for example, by a serialnumber stored in the non-volatile memory 825. In this, either the bodyworn device 40 has an embedded serial number that is then linked to theuser data 103 or some part of the user data 103 is uploaded and storedin the non-volatile memory 825 (see FIG. 15) of the body worn device 40such as the name of the wearer. In this way, either the serial number orthat part of the user data 103 is later used as part of thecommunications between the body worn device 40 and the base station 110to identify the wearer (e.g. inmate). Once the user data 103 iscaptured/linked and the issuance is complete, this body worn device 40is enabled and tested 102. For example, communications are establishedand test messages sent/received between the wireless transceiver 70 ofthe body worn device 40 and the base station 110 to insure properoperation. If the enablement and testing 102 is successful, the bodyworn device 40 is then locked 104, for example, locked around thewearer's (e.g., inmate's) appendage (e.g. leg or arm).

In some embodiments, it is anticipated that software updates for theprocessor within the body worn device 40 are performed, as necessary,through the wireless interface between the wireless transceiver 70 andthe base station transceiver 935.

In some embodiments, the condition of the battery in the body worndevice 40 is also reported during some or all transmissions. In someembodiments, diagnostics or self-tests are performed duringinitialization and/or periodically and any anomalies are reportedthrough the wireless interface between the wireless transceiver 70 andthe base station transceiver 935.

Referring to FIG. 6, a block diagram of a body worn device 40 detectingwireless activity is shown. In this example, an offending device 12(e.g. a cellular phone) is activated to establish a call through thecellular network 10, and for example, eventually through theplain-old-telephone system (POTS) 19 to another person (not shown). Notethat call records 13 are created to record the call, origination,destination, length of call, etc. In this example, the origination isrecorded for the offending device 12 (e.g. cellular phone) at a certaingeographic area. Such records are useful in after-the-fact tracking, butare not very helpful in finding the offending device 12. In thisscenario, the circuitry 50/50A within the body worn device 40 detectsthe radio frequency signal 21 from the offending device 12. Upondetection, the circuitry 50/50A compiles a message including, forexample, the frequency of the radio frequency signal 21, the signalstrength of the radio frequency signal 21, any known protocol data fromthe radio frequency signal 2, an identification of the body worn device40 (e.g. a serial number or name/identification of the wearer), the timeand/or date of the event, and, if available from a positioning subsystem94, the latitude and longitude of the body worn device 40. This messageis optionally encrypted then transmitted from the wireless transceiver70 of the body worn device 40. The message is then received by either orboth of an optional repeater 100 and/or a base station 110 where themessage is detected, decrypted if it was encrypted and the data isanalyzed to determine the wearer (e.g. inmate) associated with the bodyworn device 40, the type of offending device 12, and, optionally thelocation of the body worn device 40 and, therefore, the location of thewearer (e.g. inmate). An exemplary alert report screen that is displayedafter reception of such a message by the base station 110 is shown inFIG. 8.

Although not required, the transmission of the signal/message isperformed using an end-to-end protocol that assures proper reception ofthe signal/message. All forms of reliable transmissions are anticipated,including automatic retransmission of unacknowledged attempts,retransmission of signals/messages that were received with errors, errorcorrecting protocols, etc. In such embodiments, once an event occurs,transmission is continually attempted until it is properly received atthe base station or, in some embodiments, until it is deemed futile tocontinue such transmissions. In some embodiments, if a second eventoccurs during the transmission and/or retransmission of a first event isunderway, the second event (and subsequent events as storage permits) iscaptured in memory (e.g. non-volatile memory 825 (see FIG. 15) until asecond (and subsequent) signal/message is sent.

In some embodiments, the circuit 50A within the body worn device 40includes a positioning system 94 and the message includes, for example,the latitude and longitude of the body worn device 40. In someembodiments, the circuitry 50 within the body worn device 40 lacks apositioning system 94 and/or positioning signals are not being receivedand the message cannot include a location of the body worn device 40. Insuch, triangulation is used to determine the location of the body worndevice 40 as is described along with FIG. 7.

As previously discussed, to avoid detection and to extend battery life,often the offending devices 12 are powered completely off when not inuse, thereby not emitting any type of radio frequency signal until theuser (e.g. inmate) desires to make a call or data connection. Suchdevices are so small that they are easily hidden and, because there isno radio frequency emissions when powered off, such devices cannot bedetected by radio frequency sweeps of the inmate areas (e.g. cells,common areas, etc.). Therefore, the likely scenario is that the radiofrequency transmission that is being detected by the body worn device 40is that of a registration event of the offending device 12. In this,before the offending device 12 is able to send/receive data or makephone calls through the cellular network 10, the cellular network 10must recognize the secure identification of the offending device 12.This registration occurs when the offending device 12 is initiallypowered (turned on). Therefore, once the base station 110 received thetransmission of the signal/message, the base station 110 sends a securetransaction to the cellular carrier system 11 reporting the frequency ofthe registration signal from the offending device. As the frequency ofregistration signals is very low (not very many users power-on theirdevices during a short period of time), the cellular carrier system 11reliably associates the secure transaction with the attempt to registerthe offending device 12. Responsive to the secure transaction, thecellular carrier system 11 disconnects from the offending device 12. Insome embodiments, the cellular carrier system 11 also disable an account9 associated with the offending device 12. By disabling the account 9associated with the offending device 12, no future calls or datatransmission is allowed by the offending device 12 until the account 9is enabled. In some embodiments, the cellular carrier system 11 disablesthe account 9 associated with the offending device 12, allowing onlyemergency calls, but no non-emergency calls and no data transmission isallowed by the offending device 12 until the account 9 is enabled. Insome embodiments, the cellular carrier system 11 and cellular network 10reports the account 9 to authorities, as someone had to create theaccount 9 and may have created other similar accounts.

Referring to FIG. 7, a block diagram of a body worn device 40 detectingwireless activity is shown in which a location of the body worn deviceis determined through triangulation. In this example, an offendingdevice 12 (e.g. a cellular phone) is activated (powered on) to establisha call through the cellular network 10, and for example, from thecellular network 10 through the plain-old-telephone system (POTS) 19 toanother person (not shown). Note that call records 13 are created torecord the call, origination, destination, length of call, etc. In thisexample, the origination is recorded as the offending device 12 is at acertain geographic area. Such records are useful in after-the-facttracking, but are not very helpful in finding and confiscating theoffending device 12. In this scenario, the circuit 50A within the bodyworn device 40 detects the radio frequency signal 21 from the offendingdevice 12. Upon detection, the circuitry 50/50A compiles a messageincluding, for example, the frequency of the radio frequency signal 21,the signal strength of the radio frequency signal 21, any known protocoldata from the radio frequency signal 2, an identification of the bodyworn device 40 (e.g. a serial number or name/identification of thewearer), the time and/or date of the event, and, if available from apositioning subsystem 94, the latitude and longitude of the body worndevice 40. This message is optionally encrypted then transmitted fromthe wireless transceiver 70 of the body worn device 40. The message isthen received by either or both of an optional repeater 100 and/or abase station 110 where the message is detected, decrypted if it wasencrypted and the data is analyzed to determine the wearer (e.g. inmate)associated with the body worn device 40, the type of offending device12, and, optionally the location of the body worn device 40 and,therefore, the location of the wearer (e.g. inmate). An exemplary alertreport screen that is displayed after reception of such a message by thebase station 110 is shown in FIG. 8.

Although not required, the transmission of the signal/message isperformed using an end-to-end protocol that assures proper reception ofthe signal/message. All forms of reliable transmissions are anticipated,including automatic retransmission of unacknowledged attempts,retransmission of signals/messages that were received with errors, errorcorrecting protocols, etc. In such embodiments, once an event occurs,transmission is continually attempted until it is properly received atthe base station or, in some embodiments, until it is deemed futile tocontinue such transmissions. In some embodiments, if a second eventoccurs during the transmission and/or retransmission of a first event isunderway, the second event (and subsequent events as storage permits) iscaptured in memory (e.g. non-volatile memory 825 (see FIG. 15) until asecond (and subsequent) signal/message is sent.

In some embodiments, the circuit 50A within the body worn device 40includes a positioning system 94 and the message includes, for example,the latitude and longitude of the body worn device 40. In someembodiments, the circuitry 50 within the body worn device 40 lacks apositioning system 94 and/or positioning signals are not being receivedand the message cannot include a location of the body worn device 40. Insuch, triangulation is used to determine the location of the body worndevice 40 as is described along with FIG. 7. In some embodiments, theprocessor 60 monitors signal strength and/or timing of signals frommultiple repeaters 100A/100B and the base station 110 to determine arelative location of the body worn device 40 (e.g. a location of thebody worn device within a correctional institution).

As previously discussed, to avoid detection and to extend battery life,often the offending devices 12 are powered completely off when not inuse, thereby not emitting any type of radio frequency signal until theuser (e.g. inmate) desires to make a call or data connection. Suchdevices are so small that they are easily hidden and, because there isno radio frequency emissions when powered off, such devices cannot bedetected by radio frequency sweeps of the inmate areas (e.g. cells,common areas, etc.). Therefore, the likely scenario is that the radiofrequency transmission that is being detected by the body worn device 40is that of a registration event of the offending device 12. In this,before the offending device 12 is able to send/receive data or makephone calls through the cellular network 10, the cellular network 10must recognize the secure identification of the offending device 12.This registration occurs when the offending device 12 is initiallypowered (turned on). Therefore, once the base station 110 receives thetransmission of the signal/message, the base station 110 sends a securetransaction to the cellular carrier system 11 reporting the frequency ofthe registration signal from the offending device. As the frequency ofregistration signals is very low (not very many users power-on theirdevices during a short period of time), the cellular carrier system 11reliably associates the secure transaction with the attempt to registerthe offending device 12. Responsive to the secure transaction, thecellular carrier system 11 disconnects from the offending device 12. Insome embodiments, the cellular carrier system 11 also disable an account9 associated with the offending device 12. By disabling the account 9associated with the offending device 12, no future calls or datatransmission is allowed by the offending device 12 until the account 9is enabled. In some embodiments, the cellular carrier system 11 disablesthe account 9 associated with the offending device 12, allowing onlyemergency calls, but no non-emergency calls and no data transmission isallowed by the offending device 12 until the account 9 is enabled. Insome embodiments, the cellular carrier system 11 and cellular network 10reports the account 9 to authorities, as someone had to create theaccount 9 and may have created other similar accounts.

In some embodiments, the processor 60 determines the location of thebody worn device 40 and encodes the location into the message. Thismessage is optionally encrypted then transmitted from the wirelesstransceiver 70 of the body worn device 40. The message is then receivedby any of a plurality of repeaters 100A/100B and/or a base station 110where the message is decoded, decrypted (if encrypted) and the data isanalyzed to determine the wearer (e.g. inmate) associated with the bodyworn device 40, and the type of offending device 12. In some examples,the body worn device 40 has no capability of determining a location ofthe body worn device 40. In some such embodiments, the location of thewearer (e.g. inmate) is derived from the radio frequency signal as it isreceived by the plurality of repeaters 100A/100B and base stations 110.It is known how to determine the origin of a radio frequency signalthrough triangulation of the radio frequency signal. Triangulation istypically performed by measuring the time at which the stations100A/100B/110 receive the signal (e.g. if the repeater 100A receives thesignal first and the repeater 100B and base station 110 receive thesignal at the same time a few milliseconds later, the body worn deviceis closer to repeater 100A and midway between the repeater 100B and thebase station 110). Triangulation systems are known to accuratelytranslate these reception times into latitude and longitude values giventhe latitudes and longitudes of each of the triangulating receivers100A/100B/110. In some triangulation systems, signal strength is usedeither separately or in conjunction with signal timing to determine thelocation of the body worn device 40.

An exemplary alert report screen that is displayed after reception ofsuch a message and triangulation by the base station 110 is shown inFIG. 8.

The following examples use a fictitious inmate, John Doe, as an exampleof a person assigned and wearing a body worn device 40. Note that thedisclosed inventions are in any way limited to prisons or correctionalfacilities.

Referring to FIG. 8, an exemplary user interface 200 showing the statusof a body worn device 40 is shown. In this example, data pertaining tothe person 202 includes an inmate name (John Doe), an inmate number(Ser. No. 12/345,678), and a home location (Cell 8). Data 204 pertainingto the body worn device 40 assigned to this inmate includes adescription of the device (Leg BWD) and a code (34AF2BAA) which is, forexample, a serial number of this body worn device 40. Next, status 206of the assigned body worn device 40 is shown/displayed, including anindication that the device has been enabled, a condition of the battery,whether the body worn device 40 has detected any radio frequencytransmissions (No Transmissions Detected), whether the body worn device40 detects the cellular network (Detected), and the latitude andlongitude of the body worn device 40. Note that, in some embodiments,more or less information is included.

Referring to FIG. 9, an exemplary user interface 200 showing the statusof a body worn device 40 when the body worn device has been cloaked isshown. Cloaking is performed when the body worn device 40 is shieldedfrom radio waves so that no radio waves are exchanged between the bodyworn device 40 and, for example, a cellular carrier system 11 or basestation 110.

In this example, data pertaining to the person 202 includes an inmatename (John Doe), an inmate number (Ser. No. 12/345,678), and a homelocation (Cell 8). Data 204 pertaining to the body worn device 40assigned to this inmate includes a description of the device (Leg BWD)and a code (34AF2BAA) which is, for example, a serial number of thisbody worn device 40. Next, status 206A of the assigned body worn device40 is shown, including an indication that the device has been enabled, acondition of the battery, a time/date of the event, whether the bodyworn device 40 has detected any radio frequency transmissions (NoTransmissions Detected), whether the body worn device 40 detects thecellular network (No Network Detected), and the latitude and longitudeof the body worn device 40. In this case, the device is not detectingany signal from a cellular network (e.g. local tower) and, therefore, itis believed that the body worn device 40 has been cloaked by, forexample, submerging the body worn device 40 in water or encapsulatingthe body worn device 40 in metal foil, etc. In an alternate embodiment,as will be described, heartbeat monitors are implemented to make sureeach body worn device 40 is operating and hasn't been cloaked. Forexample, the base station 110 polls each body worn device 40 every 30seconds and if no response is received, the status of the body worndevice 40 that hasn't responded is updated and appropriate alarms areissued. In an alternate heartbeat embodiment, the timing is performed inboth the base station 110 and the body worn device 40. In this, the bodyworn device 40 transmits a heartbeat signal or packet at a scheduledinterval such as every 30 seconds. The base station 110 has a timer foreach body worn device 40 that is set to an interval just longer thanthis schedule interval, for example 40 seconds. Each time the basestation 110 receives the heartbeat signal/packet, the timer is reset tothe interval (e.g. 40 seconds) and never expires. If the heartbeat isnot received within the allotted time (e.g. 40 seconds), the status isupdates and alarms issued as appropriate. Since there are reasonsbesides cloaking that a single heartbeat transmission might get lost, itis anticipated that more complicated algorithms are used to manageheartbeats and to perform other communication tests when one is missedbefore initiating status changes and/or alarms. Note that, in someembodiments, more or less information is included. In some embodiments,the body worn device 40 has circuitry that will detect shielding such aswrapping the body worn device 40 in foil, and will report the alarm oncethe shielding is removed as there is no way to report the alarm whilethe body worn device 40 is shielded.

Referring to FIG. 10, an exemplary user interface 200 showing the statusof a body worn device 40 upon detection of a radio frequency signal 21is shown (e.g. a radio frequency signal 21 from an offending device 12).In this example, data pertaining to the person 202 includes an inmatename (John Doe), an inmate number (Ser. No. 12/345,678), and a homelocation (Cell 8). Data 204 pertaining to the body worn device 40assigned to this inmate includes a description of the device (Leg BWD)and a code (34AF2BAA) which is, for example, a serial number of thisbody worn device 40. Next, status 206B of the assigned body worn device40 is shown, including an indication that the device has been enabled, acondition of the battery, a time/date of the event, whether the bodyworn device 40 has detected any radio frequency transmissions(UNAUTHORIZED Transmissions Detected), whether the body worn device 40detects the cellular network (Detected), and the latitude and longitudeof the body worn device 40. In this example, the associated body worndevice 40 has detected an unauthorized radio frequency transmission.Note that, in some embodiments, more or less information is included.

The user interface shown is an overly simplified interface forunderstanding purposes. It is anticipated that the Location (latitudeand longitude) be used to pin point the user (e.g. inmate) within afloor map of the building to quickly find that user (e.g. inmate) andconfiscate the infringing transmitting device. Furthermore, otherinformation regarding the radio frequency signal 21 that was detected bythe body worn device 40, when available, are displayed, for example,frequencies and signal strength for each frequency received, durationsof signals, etc. In some embodiments, such information is furtheranalyzed to classify the transmission device so that after confiscation,it is known whether the correct device has been confiscated. Forexample, if a cellular signal is detected but, after searching, only atablet computer 15 is found, authorities know to keep searching untilthey find the offending device 12 (cellular phone).

Referring to FIG. 10A, an exemplary account record 220 of an account 9is shown. The data in the account record 220 is similar to data in mostpeople's cellular phone account records, though the data in the accountrecord 220 is shown greatly abbreviated for clarity and brevity reasons.In this abbreviated example, the account record 220 has informationregarding the account owner 222 such as the account owner's name andaddress. The account record 220 also has information regarding thedevice (or devices) 224 associated with the account record 220. In thiscase there is one device associated with the account record 220 that isa “MFG 610” (fictitious) smartphone that has a SIM ID of 11AACD21E andis associated with a phone number 123-456-7890.

The account record 220 also has information regarding status and billing226 that includes whether the device is enabled, data and call limits,billing data (e.g. total call duration has been 3 minutes), etc.

As discussed previously, when the offending device 12 is turned on, theoffending device 12 attempts to register with a cell tower by emitting arelatively high-power radio frequency signal at a specific frequency(with the requisite protocol). The cellular carrier system 11 receives apacket of information from the offending device 12 that includes the SIMID of the offending device 12. The cellular carrier system 11 utilizesthe SIM ID (and in some embodiment, other data) to locate the accountrecord 220 associated with the offending device 12. The cellular carriersystem 11 makes sure that the offending device 12 is enabled and hassufficient credentials and payments to operate and, once certain, thecellular carrier system 11 allows the offending device 12 tosend/receive data and make cellular calls.

Now, as previously described, the processor 60 and radio frequencyreceiver/detection circuit(s) 80/82 detect this specific radio frequencysignal (and possibly a specific protocol). Responsive to such, theprocessor 60 initiates a transaction from the wireless transceiver 70 tothe base station 110, including the specific frequency of the radiofrequency signal. The base station 110 immediately sends a securetransaction to the cellular carrier system 11, including the specificfrequency. As the cellular carrier system 11 knows which devices areinitializing and at what time, the cellular carrier system 11 correlatesthe specific frequency of the attempt to register the offending device12 with the cellular carrier system 11. Now the cellular carrier system11 takes an agreed upon action to thwart the offending device's 12attempt to register and send data or make a phone call by, for example,disconnecting from the offending device 12, disabling certain featuresfor the offending device 12 (e.g., disabling data transmission,disabling calls, disabling calls except for emergency calls). The netresults is the offending device 12 is unable to send/receive data andunable to make illegal phone calls. Further, in some embodiments, theaccount record 220 is locked (status changed to disabled or locked), andin some embodiments, information regarding the account owner 222 such asthe account owner's name and address are provided to law enforcementpersonnel (e.g. under a subpoena) to determine what party is registeringthe offending devices 12.

Referring to FIG. 11, a flow chart of exemplary software of the bodyworn device 40 is shown. When power is initially applied to the bodyworn device 40, the processor 60 initializes 400 and then initializescommunications 402. For example, communications with a base station 110is initialized 402. The system repeatedly attempts to communicate withthe base station 110 until a connection is detected 404, at which timethe body worn device identification is established 406. This isperformed by either reading a hard or soft serial number of the bodyworn device 40 and transmitting that serial number to the base station110 or by determining a unique serial number by the base station 110 andtransmitting that serial number to the body worn device 40 where theserial number is then stored in non-volatile memory 825. Next, a user(e.g. inmate) is assigned 408 to that serial number so that, any futurecommunications containing that serial number will be identifiable withthat user (e.g. inmate). Now the radio frequency receiver/detectioncircuit 80 is enabled 412 to monitor radio frequency transmissions inthe local of the body worn device 40.

Until reset, the circuitry 50 of the body worn device continuouslyloops, each time through the loop accessing the radio frequencyreceiver/detection circuit 80 to determine if the signal from thecellular network 10 has been blocked or masked 420 (e.g. is the bodyworn device being cloaked?), accessing the tamper detection subsystem 90to determine if tampering has been detected 430, and accessing the radiofrequency receiver/detection circuit 80 to determine if there has beenany unauthorized radio frequency transmission 440. If it is determinedthat the signal from the cellular network 10 has been blocked or masked420 (e.g., a signal from the cellular network 10 is not received), asignal or packet indicating that this particular body worn device 40 hasbeen cloaked or masked 450 is sent to the base station 110. If tamperinghas been detected 430, a signal or packet indicating that thisparticular body worn device 40 has been tampered (e.g. removed, broke)460 is sent to the base station 110. If there has been any unauthorizedradio frequency transmission 440, a signal or packet indicating thatthis particular body worn device 40 has detected such radio frequenciesis transmitted 470 is sent to the base station 110.

Referring to FIG. 12, a flow chart of a second exemplary processor 60 ofthe body worn device 40 is shown. This flow is similar to that shown inFIG. 11, except implementing a heartbeat monitor to determine if thebody worn device 40 has been cloaked. When power is initially applied tothe body worn device 40, the processor 60 initializes 400. Next,communication is initialized 402, in a preferred embodiment with a basestation 110. The system repeatedly attempts to communicate with the basestation 110 until a connection is detected 404, at which time the bodyworn device identification is established 406. This is performed byeither reading a hard or soft serial number of the body worn device 40and transmitting that serial number to the base station 110 or bydetermining a unique serial number by the base station 110 andtransmitting that serial number to the body worn device 40 where theserial number is then stored in non-volatile memory 825. Next, a user(e.g. inmate) is assigned 408 to that serial number so that, any futurecommunications containing that serial number will be identifiable withthat user (e.g. inmate). For embodiments with a heartbeat method ofdetecting cloaking, the heartbeat timer is initialized 410. There aremany ways to implement heartbeat monitoring, this being one of them. Thebasic operation has two timers, one in the base station and one in thebody worn device 40. The timer in the base station is set somewhatlonger than one or two periods of the timer in the body worn device 40,for example, the timer in the base station is set to 40 second and thetimer in the body worn device 40 is set to 30 seconds (or 15 seconds toreceive two heartbeats before the base station timer expires). Each timethe heartbeat is received by the base station 110, the base stationtimer is reset (e.g. to 40 seconds). If no heartbeats signals/packetsare receive within the base station timer interval, the base stationtimer expires and it is declared that the body worn device 40 has lostcommunications and is possibly being cloaked.

Next the radio frequency receiver/detection circuit 80 is enabled 412 tomonitor radio frequency transmissions in the local of the body worndevice 40.

Until reset, the circuitry 50 of the body worn device 40 continuouslyloops, each time through the loop accessing the radio frequencyreceiver/detection circuit 80 to determine if the cellular network 10 ispresent 420 (e.g. is the body worn device being cloaked?), accessing thetamper detection subsystem 90 to determine if tampering has beendetected 430, accessing the radio frequency receiver/detection circuit80 to determine if there has been any unauthorized radio frequencytransmission 440, and checking the heartbeat timer in the body worndevice 40 to determine if a heartbeat needs to be transmitted 442. Ifthe cellular network 10 is not present 420, a signal or packetindicating that this particular body worn device 40 has been cloaked ormasked 450 is sent to the base station 110. If tampering has beendetected 430, a signal or packet indicating that this particular bodyworn device 40 has been tampered (e.g. removed, broke) 460 is sent tothe base station 110. If there has been any unauthorized radio frequencytransmission 440, a signal or packet indicating that this particularbody worn device 40 has detected such radio frequencies is transmitted470 is sent to the base station 110. If a heartbeat needs to betransmitted 442, the heartbeat signal/packet is transmitted and theheartbeat timer is reset to schedule the next heartbeat transmission444. FIG. 13 shows an exemplary flow for transmitting these signals orpackets while FIG. 14 shows an exemplary flow in the base station 110for processing receipt of these signals or packets.

Referring to FIG. 13, a third flow chart of a typical transmission by aprocessor 60 of the body worn device 40 is shown. In this, if available,the signal strength 510 and the signal frequency 520 are read from theradio frequency receiver/detection circuit 80. Note that in someembodiments, the signal content is also detected, for example, signalenergy patterns and decoded data content. Next, communications areattempted with the base station 110 until a connection is established530. Once communication is established 530 with the base station 110,the signal or packet(s) is transmitted 540, typically including thereason for the transmission (e.g. heartbeat, radio frequency detected,loss of cellular signal, tamper detected, battery low, etc.), theidentification (serial number) of the body worn device 40, optionally,the frequency and/or signal strength of the radio frequency signal,optionally the duration of the radio frequency signal and time, andoptionally the latitude and longitude of the body worn device 40. Next,to assure that the packet/signal was received by the base station 110,the body worn device software waits for an acknowledgement 550. If anacknowledgement 550 is received, the transmission process is complete(e.g. returns to the loops of FIG. 11 or FIG. 12. If an acknowledgement550 is not received (e.g. within an expected time frame), thetransmission process is repeated from step 530.

The simplified example of transmitting between the body worn device 40and the base station 110 as described is but an example as reliable datatransmission is well known and many methods and protocols exist toperform such transmissions. The exemplary program flows described herewithin are but examples and one skilled in the art will readily be ableto produce a transmission mechanism capable of such communication.

Referring to FIG. 14, a flow chart of a base station (see FIG. 16) isshown. The described flow generally operates on a processor within, forexample the base station 110. As known in the industry, this controlflow is often implemented as an application that runs, along with otherapplications, on a dedicated or multi-purpose computer system, anexample of which is shown in FIG. 16. The described application isthreaded to monitor one single body worn device 40, though it isanticipated that many body worn devices 40 are present and monitored bya similar application or multiple instantiations of this exemplaryprocess flow.

The following relates to communications with one or many body worndevice 40, though the same is anticipated for multiple body worn devices40. When the application starts running, general initialization isperformed 600, communications is initialized 602, and then communicationwith the body worn device(s) 40 is established 604, looping untilcommunication is made. Once communications are established 604, theidentification of the body worn device 40 is read or set 606 (asdescribed with FIGS. 11 and 12), establishing an identifier (e.g.,serial number) of the body worn device 40 and a user (e.g. inmate) isassigned to that identifier 608. In systems in which there is aheartbeat, a heartbeat timer is initialized 610 as described previously.

Now a loop is entered. The first step of the loop is to determine if apacket or signal has been received 615 from the body worn device 40. Ifno packet or signal has been received 615, the heartbeat timer ischecked for expiration 680 (e.g. the timer expires if no heartbeats arereceived within the heartbeat timer interval). If the heartbeat timerexpired 680, an appropriate indication/alarm is made 685 (e.g. messagedisplay, flashing light, etc.) and the loop continues.

If a packet or signal has been received 615 from the body worn device40, a determination of the type of packet or signal is made. If thepacket/signal indicates that the body worn device 40 has lost presenceof a cellular network signal 620 (e.g. it is cloaked), an appropriateindication/alarm is made 625 (e.g. message display, flashing light,etc.) and the loop continues.

If the packet/signal indicates that the body worn device 40 has beentampered with 630 (e.g. it has been removed from the user/inmate), anappropriate indication/alarm is made 635 (e.g. message display, flashinglight, etc.) and the loop continues.

If the packet/signal indicates that the body worn device 40 detected anunauthorized radio frequency transmission 640, an appropriateindication/alarm is made 645 (e.g. message display, flashing light,etc.—hopefully alerting staff/guards to confiscate the offendingdevice); a secure message is sent 646 to the cellular carrier system 11;and the loop continues.

If the packet/signal indicates that the body worn device 40 is sending aheartbeat signal 650, the heartbeat timer is reset 655 and the loopcontinues.

If none of the above (e.g., an unknown packet/signal was received), anerror is recorded and appropriate actions taken to restore the system tolevel of operation such as a complete reset, etc.

Referring to FIG. 15, a schematic view of an exemplary circuitry 50/50Aof the body worn device 40 is shown. The example system represents anexemplary processor-based system housed in a body worn device 40.Although, throughout this description, a processor-based system isdescribed, it is known to implement the same or similar functionality ina system of logic or analog components providing similar functionalityin an equivalent system. The source of power 98 (e.g., battery, powermanagement, charge control, etc.) is not shown for clarity reasons.

The exemplary system of the body worn device 40 is shown in its simplestform, having a single processor 60 (e.g., controller, microcontroller,microprocessor, etc.). Many different computer architectures are knownthat accomplish similar results in a similar fashion and the presentinvention is not limited in any way to any particular processingelement. In exemplary circuitry of the body worn device 40, a processor60 executes or runs stored programs that are generally stored forexecution within a memory 820. The processor 60 is any processor, forexample an ARM Coretex single chip processor or the like. The memory 820is connected to the processor by a memory bus 815 and is any memory 820suitable for connection with the selected processor 60, such as SRAM,DRAM, SDRAM, RDRAM, DDR, DDR-2, etc. Also connected to the processor 60is a system bus 830 for connecting to peripheral subsystems. In general,the non-volatile memory 825 is interfaced to the processor 60 throughthe system bus 830 and is used to store programs, executable code anddata persistently. Examples of persistent storage include core memory,FRAM, flash memory, etc.

In embodiments in which Global Positioning is included, a positioningsystem 94 (e.g. GPS) is interfaced to the processor 60 by the system bus830. In such, the processor controls the positioning system 94 operationby sending commands to the positioning system 94 over the system bus 830and receiving status and data back in a similar manner (e.g. latitudeand longitude).

The radio frequency receiver/detection circuit 80 (only one is shown) isalso interfaced to the processor 60 by the system bus 830. In such, theprocessor controls the operation of the radio frequencyreceiver/detection circuit 80 by sending commands to the radio frequencyreceiver/detection circuit 80 over the system bus 830 and receivingstatus and data back in a similar manner (e.g. signal frequency andstrength).

The tamper detection subsystem 90 is also interfaced to the processor 60by, for example, the system bus 830 (or through an input/output port,etc.). In such, the processor controls the operation of the tamperdetection subsystem 90 by sending commands to the tamper detectionsubsystem 90 over the system bus 830 and receiving status and data backin a similar manner (e.g. intact or “device removed from body,” etc.).

The circuitry 50 of the body worn device 40 communicates with the landbased system (e.g. base stations 110) through a wireless interface andwireless transceiver 70. The wireless interface and wireless transceiver70 is also interfaced to the processor 60 by, for example, the systembus 830 (or through an input port, etc.). In such, the processorcommunicates with and controls the operation of the wireless interfaceand wireless transceiver 70 by sending commands and data to the wirelessinterface and wireless transceiver 70 over the system bus 830 andreceiving status and data back in a similar manner.

Although a specific architecture is shown connecting the varioussubsystems 94/80/90/825/70 to the processor 60, any known interface isanticipated including, but not limited to, parallel bus architectures,serial bus architectures, parallel/serial bus architectures,input/output port interfaces, Inter-Integrated Circuit links(I²C—two-wire interface), etc.

In some embodiments, a sound emitting device 97 (not shown) isinterfaced to the processor 60, in this example, through an output pin,though any form of connection is anticipated, including an interface tothe system bus 830. Any type of sound emitting device 97 is anticipatedsuch as a piezoelectric element, speaker, electromechanical vibrator,indirect sound emitter, etc. In some embodiments, the sound emittingdevice is driven directly by the processor 60; while in otherembodiments, the sound emitting device includes driver circuitry such asan oscillator and/or power amplifier.

Referring to FIG. 16, a schematic view of an exemplary system of thebase station 110 is shown. The example system represents an exemplaryprocessor-based system. Although, throughout this description, aprocessor-based system is described, it is known to implement the sameor similar functionality in a system of logic or analog componentsproviding similar functionality in an equivalent system.

The exemplary base station 110 as shown in its simplest form has asingle processor for the base station controller 900 (e.g., controller,microcontroller, microprocessor, etc.). Many different computerarchitectures are known that accomplish similar results in a similarfashion and the present invention is not limited in any way to anyparticular processing element 900. In exemplary systems, a processor(the base station controller 900) executes or runs stored programs thatare generally stored for execution within a memory 920. The processor(the base station controller 900) is any processor. The memory 920 isconnected to the processor by a memory bus 915 and is any memory 920suitable for connection with the selected processor 900, such as SRAM,DRAM, SDRAM, RDRAM, DDR, DDR-2, etc. Also connected to the processor 900is a system bus 930 for connecting to peripheral subsystems. In general,the secondary storage 925 is interfaced to the processor 900 through thesystem bus 930 and is used to store programs, executable code and datapersistently. Examples of secondary storage 925 include semiconductordisks, rotating media, hard disks, CD-ROM, DVD-RW, CD-RW, flash memory,etc.

The base station 110 communicates with the body worn devices 40 througha wireless interface and base station transceiver 935. The wirelessinterface and base station transceiver 935 is preferably interfaced tothe processor 900 by, for example, the system bus 930 but alternatelyinterfaces through an input port, etc. The processor 900 communicateswith and controls the operation of the wireless interface and basestation transceiver 935 by sending commands and data to the wirelessinterface and base station transceiver 935 over the system bus 930 andreceiving status and data back in a similar manner.

For completeness, optional input and output devices 991/993 are shownsuch as a display 991 and a keyboard 993, though many different back endarchitectures are anticipated including one or more processors/computersystems, linked together for distribution and/or redundancy reasonsalong with a variety of input and output devices optionally includingany or all of card readers, badge readers, indicator lights, lightingcontrol systems, audible alarms, interfaces to cell locking systems,interfaces to door locking systems, camera systems, motion detectionsystems, door open/closed detection systems, etc.

In some embodiments, the base station 110 also includes tamper detection985 similar or different from the tamper detection subsystem 90 of thebody worn device 40. In such, intrusion into the base station 110 and/orrelocation of the base station outside of a given allowed area isdetermined, recorded, and/or alerted. For example, in one embodiment,the tamper detection 985 includes a positioning device (e.g., GPS) thatconstantly monitors the location of the base station 110. If the basestation 110 is moved to a new location that is outside of apredetermined area, alerts are made such as transmitting an alert toother base stations 110 or repeaters 100, locking/encrypting data, etc.Other types of base station tamper detectors 985 are anticipated,including, but not limited to, motion sensors, accelerometers, etc. Itis also anticipated that the base station 110 be physically affixed tofurniture to reduce chances of removal.

In some embodiments, the base station 110 (and/or the repeaters 100)is/are mobile devices, allowing for the base station 110 to be portableand carried by guards, staff, etc.

Referring to FIG. 17, a partial flow chart of an exemplary cellularcarrier system 11 is shown. The cellular carrier system 11 opens asecure channel 700 with the base station 110. This channel must besecure so that others (e.g. hackers) are not able to impede legitimatecommunications. This portion of the cellular carrier system softwareloops, waiting 702 for reception of any activity on the secure channel.Once activity on the secure channel is detected 702, the time andspecific frequency of the registration attempt is received 704 from thebase station 110. As discussed previously, when the offending device 12is turned on, the offending device 12 attempts to register with a celltower by emitting a radio frequency signal at a specific frequency (withthe requisite protocol). It is anticipated that this registration eventhas already occurred and the cellular carrier system 11 has alreadyreceived a packet of information from the offending device 12 thatincludes the SIM ID of the offending device 12. The cellular carriersystem 11 has already utilized the SIM ID (and in some embodiment, otherdata) to locate the account record 220 associated with the offendingdevice 12 to makes sure that the offending device 12 is enabled and hassufficient credentials and payments to operate. In some embodiments, thecellular carrier system 11 has already allowed the offending device 12to start sending/receiving data and/or initiated a cellular call.

Armed with the time that the base station 110 and the body worn device40 detected the offending device 12 initiating the registration as wellas, in some embodiments, the specific frequency (in some embodiments,there are multiple frequencies upon which the offending device 12 isable to register), recent activity is searched 706 to make sure aregistration occurred at the given time and, in some embodiments, usingthe specific frequency. If such activity was not detected 710, the loopcontinues. Perhaps another cellular carrier system 11 processed theregistration.

If such activity was not detected 710, any data or voice call currentlyunderway is disconnected/canceled 714. Now, if the strategy is todisable 720 the account record 220, the status of the account record 220is set to disabled 722 and the loop continues. if the strategy is todisable 724 the account record 220 but allow emergency calls (e.g. callsto 911), the status of the account record 220 is set to disabled/allowemergency calls 726 and the loop continues.

Equivalent elements can be substituted for the ones set forth above suchthat they perform in substantially the same manner in substantially thesame way for achieving substantially the same result.

It is believed that the system and method as described and many of itsattendant advantages will be understood by the foregoing description. Itis also believed that it will be apparent that various changes may bemade in the form, construction and arrangement of the components thereofwithout departing from the scope and spirit of the invention or withoutsacrificing all of its material advantages. The form herein beforedescribed being merely exemplary and explanatory embodiment thereof. Itis the intention of the following claims to encompass and include suchchanges.

What is claimed is:
 1. A system for detecting and disabling radiofrequency emitting devices, the system comprising: at least one basestation, the base station including a base station processor and a basestation transceiver, the base station transceiver operatively coupled tothe base station processor; at least one device, each of the at leastone device comprising a device-processor, a transceiver operativelycoupled to the device-processor, a radio frequency detector operativelycoupled to the device-processor, and a source of power, the source ofpower providing operational power to the device-processor, to thetransceiver and to the radio frequency detector; an offending device;software running on the device-processor of each device monitors theradio frequency detector and when a target radio signal from theoffending device is detected by the radio frequency detector indicatingan attempt by the offending device to register with a cell tower, theradio frequency detector signals the processor with an indication of thetarget radio signal that was detected and the software reads theindication of the target radio signal and controls the transceiver tosend a transaction to the base station transceiver, the transactionincludes the indication of the target radio signal that was detected;upon receipt of the transaction at the base station transceiver,software running on the base station processor reads the transaction andsends a secure transaction to a cellular carrier system, the securetransaction including the indication of the target radio signal that wasdetected; and upon receipt of the secure transaction, software runningon a computer of the cellular carrier system correlates a time and thetarget radio signal with an account associated with a recentregistration of the offending device and when the computer of thecellular carrier system correlates the time and the indication of thetarget radio signal to the account associated with the recentregistration, the computer of the cellular carrier system disconnectsthe offending device.
 2. The system for detecting and disabling radiofrequency emitting devices of claim 1, wherein when the computer of thecellular carrier system correlates the time and the indication of thetarget radio signal to the account associated with the recentregistration, the computer of the cellular carrier system furtherdisables the account associated with the offending device.
 3. The systemfor detecting and disabling radio frequency emitting devices of claim 1,wherein the device is a body worn device.
 4. The system for detectingand disabling radio frequency emitting devices of claim 1, wherein theoffending device is a cellular phone.
 5. The system for detecting anddisabling radio frequency emitting devices of claim 1, wherein theindication of the target radio signal comprises a cellular bandfrequency on which the offending device has transmitted.
 6. The systemfor detecting and disabling radio frequency emitting devices of claim 1,wherein the indication of the target radio signal comprises a frequencyon which the offending device has transmitted.
 7. A method of detectingand disabling offending devices, the method comprising: (a) at aportable device, when an offending device is initializing andregistering with a cell tower, detecting a radio frequency transmissionfrom the offending device; (b) responsive to detecting, the portabledevice transmitting a message from a transmitter of the portable deviceto a receiver of a base station, an identification of a radio frequencysignal used by the offending device; (c) responsive to receiving themessage, the base station sending a secure transaction to a cellularcarrier system that is associated with the cell tower, the securetransaction including the identification of the radio frequency signalused by the offending device; and (d) responsive to receiving the securetransaction, the cellular carrier system correlating a time and theidentification of a radio frequency signal used by the offending devicewith an account associated with the registration of the offending deviceand when the processor of the cellular carrier system correlates thetime and the identification of a radio frequency signal used by theoffending device to the account associated with the offending device,the cellular carrier system disconnecting from the offending device. 8.The method of claim 7, further comprising disabling the accountassociated with the offending device.
 9. The method of claim 7, themessage further including an identification of the portable device. 10.The method of claim 7, wherein the portable device is a body worndevice.
 11. The method of claim 10, wherein the body worn device is alocking ankle bracelet.
 12. The method of claim 7, wherein the offendingdevice is a cellular phone.
 13. The method of claim 7, wherein theidentification of the radio frequency signal used by the offendingdevice comprises a cellular band frequency on which the offending devicehas operated.
 14. A method of detecting and disabling offending devices,the method comprising: (a) at a body-worn device, when an offendingdevice transmits a radio frequency signal to a cell tower, detecting theradio frequency signal from the offending device; (b) responsive to thedetecting, the body-worn device transmitting a message from atransmitter of the body-worn device to a receiver of a base station, themessage including an identification of the radio frequency signaltransmitted by the offending device; (c) responsive to receiving themessage, the base station sending a secure transaction to a cellularcarrier system that is associated with the cell tower, the securetransaction including the identification of the radio frequency signaltransmitted by the offending device; and (d) responsive to receiving thesecure transaction, the cellular carrier system correlating a time andthe identification of the radio frequency signal transmitted by theoffending device with an account associated with the offending deviceand when the processor of the cellular carrier system correlates thetime and the identification of the radio frequency signal transmitted bythe offending device with the account associated with the offendingdevice, the cellular carrier system disconnecting from the offendingdevice.
 15. The method of claim 14, further comprising disabling theaccount associated with the offending device.
 16. The method of claim14, the message further including an identification of the body-worndevice.
 17. The method of claim 14, wherein the body worn device islocked on to a person.
 18. The method of claim 14, wherein the body worndevice is a locking ankle bracelet.
 19. The method of claim 14, whereinthe offending device is a cellular phone.
 20. The method of claim 14,wherein the identification of the radio frequency signal transmitted bythe offending device comprises a cellular band frequency on which theoffending device has transmitted.